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INTRODUCTION 
Of the 133 developing countries for which comparable data is available, 
78 countries (World Bank, 1986) have populations below five million, while 
forty nine countries have populations of less than a million. Given the large 
number of relatively small countries, together with their often poor economic 
performance in recent years it is not surprising that an increasing amount of 
attention has been focused on the special problems of these countries (Selwyn, 
1975; Sommen, 1980; Jalan, 1982a)1• 
Is the economic structure and resulting growth mechanisms of small 
nations so different from their larger counterparts that one should as Kuznets 
(1959): 
devise variants of a theory of economic growth for the many 
small national units different from those for the few large ones; or 
can one hope to establish significant general features of modem 
economic growth by treating countries or different size as 
comparable an equivalent units. 
Should one assume that: 
the alternatives open to small countries are more narrowly 
circumscribed than those of large countries ... so much theorizing 
about growth assumes a large closed economy, that it is important 
to differentiate sharply between the growth process in a large 
closed economy and in a small open economy, and that the study 
of development could be enriched if we make a distinction 
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between large and small underdeveloped economies? (Demas, 
1965, pp.39-42) 
Interestingly enough, despite the increased academic attention devoted 
to th.e plight of smaller third world nations, economists- both theoretical and 
empmcal - have had little to say about how size per se may affect the 'nature 
~nd causes ~f.the Wealth of Nations' (Lallad Ghosh, 1982). If one looks at the 
literature, it 1s necessary to go back to the 1957 International Econom· A . . IC 
ssoc1at10n Conference as the first and perhaps only attempt to de I 
exclusively with this issue. a 
A~ong. the latter studies, that of William Demas on Caribbean 
economies is the most significant. Demas paid some attention to the 
de~elopment of what he called a 'relevant analytical framework' without 
which a rational choice in the field of economic policy could not be made A 
. . . n 
important ~01nt made by Demas was that the economic structure of small 
states was different from that of large countries, and that new analytical tools 
and concepts were necessary to consider their ec0nomic problems (Jalan 
1982b). ' 
Studies since Demas's original work, particularly those undertaken by 
Chenery ~1~60),2 have helped to enhance our understanding of the structural 
charactenst1cs of small countries and also the problems that they "a · 
. . . ~~m 
promotmg 
0
the1r economic ?evelopment. There are however some important 
gaps: The rel_evant analytical framework' to which Demas referred is still 
~ackmg, and we do .not have a plausible or consistent theory of size as an 
mdependent ~actor m development. In addition several newer, but closely 




Given that ceteris paribus smaller economies are more open than their 
large.r . counterparts, does the government expenditure/income 
m ~lt1plier tend to be much lower than in the case of larger economies? 
Given the need for most developing countries to assume more of their 
security. burdens'. have small countries been at a disadvantage 
econ~m1cally relative to larger states? Put differently, given a common 
secunty threat.is the burden o~ defence expenditures relatively greater 
fo~ smaller nations than for then larger counterparts? (Espindola 1987) 
GIVen increased political independence, do smaller states have th~ same 
sco~e. of cho~ce in economic systems available to larger countries? Is 
socialism a viable economic system in smaller developing countries?l 
!he pur~ose of this paper is to shed some light on these questions. 
Specifically, is the economic environment in small economies such that 
~overnments in t?ese states are constrained in aiding the development process 
m a manner unlike that found in larger nations? 
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DEFINITION OF SMALL ECONOMIES 
Clearly, before proceeding a number of definitional matters must be 
resolved or at least addressed: -
1. How is a small economy to be differentiated from a larger one? 
2. Is smallness best referred to in terms ofland, population, market size or 
levels of development? 
Since there is a lack of uniform definition of 'smallness', most analysts 
have been compelled to use arbitrary cut-off points in terms of population to 
distinguish small from large countries. The use of different definitions and/ or 
population cut off points4 has created difficulties in testing the va~idity of 
propositions regarding the structure and process of developm~~t m these 
economies. More importantly, because of a lack of comparab1hty due to 
different definitions of size, the conclusions of different writers on some 
important questions concerning the economic consequences of size are 
extremely difficult to interpret, let alone generalize from. 
Several approaches have been utilised to overcome these difficulties. 
Jalan for example utilises (Jalan, 1982b) a simple classification of countries 
by size based on a composite index of population, area and total GNP (as a 
proxy for capital stock). His underlying hypothesis is that ~ifferences .in 
economic structure and economic performance among developmg countnes 
due to the size factor are likely to be due to differences in the resource base of 
countries. However, Lloyd and Sundrum (1982) have questioned the validity of 
combining separate indices of size on the ground that there is no logical basis 
for assigning weights to different factors. They point out that with few 
exceptions, small economies chosen on the basis ~f.the combined ~ndex ~re 
countries with populations of less than five million (as there 1s a high 
correlation between population and the other measures of size). They suggest, 
therefore, that from a statistical point of view, it may be sufficient to classify 
countries by population alone and that a dividing line of five million 
population may be reasonable for distinguishing between small and other 
countries. 
In a major conference on small economies alternative definitional 
approaches were discussed and several conclusions seem to have gained wide 
acceptance (Jalan, 1982a, p.7). . . . 
I. For a systematic examination of the problem and pohc1es m small 
economies it is necessary to define the concept of smallness in a way 
which is likely to command general acceptance. In view of the 
difficulties involved in adopting a sharp and unique definition of small 
countries, it is also necessary to rely on a rough classificaiton of 
countries by size. The data provided in the conference papers broadly 
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supported the use of a working definition of five million population for 
studying the problems of small countries. 
2. Within the group of small economies defined in this manner, there is a 
need to distinguish between very small or •micro' states and other small 
economies. The problems of the micro states with very small 
populations and other resources were likely to be different and required 
separate consideration. 
3. It was emphasised that generalisations regarding the problems of small 
economies as a group, should be avoided as far as possible because 
differences among countries within the group could sometimes be as 
marked as intra-group differences; and 
4. The relative size of countries was likely to affect the development 
options available to them; however, it should be clearly recognised that 
in determining otherwise the development efforts, factors other than 
size were likely to be significant. It was also pointed out that in some 
regions, the inter-linkages between different countries within the region 
were so important that problems of individual countries could not be 
studied without reference to the economy of the whole region. 
A cursory examination of the descriptive statistics for both small and 
large countries does indicate that a number of economic structure and 
performance variables do tend to vary systematically between both groups. If 
for argument sake we use five million population as the cut-off point between 
large and small .economies,5 it appears that: 
1. Public consumption is somewhat higher in the small countries (19.3 per 
cent of GDP vs. 14.7 per cent of GDP for the large countries) and has 
expanded more over time relative to that in the large countries. 
2. Gross Domestic investment as a share of GDP is relatively higher in the 
small countries, but gross domestic saving is considerably below the 
levels found in the large countries. 
3. As might be expected, exports account for a significantly higher 
proportion of GDP in small countries (39.6 per cent vs. 21.9 per cent in 
1983). However, a not so apparent fact is that, whereas exports have 
been a nearly constant share of GDP in the larger countries (21.2 per 
cent and 21.9 per cent for 1960 and 1982 respectively) they increased 
from 27.9 per cent in 1960 to 39.6 per cent in 1982 for the small country 
group as a whole. 
4. Corresponding to the relatively large gap between savings and 
investment characterising the small countries is a relatively large inflow 
of external resources (as depicted here by the resource balance). 
5. The large resource gaps characteristic of the small countries manifests 
itself in correspondingly higher debt burdens ( 46.6 per cent of GDP in 
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1982 versus 30.3 per cent for the large countries. 
6. As might be imagined, the exports of the smaller countries are highly 
concentrated in fuels and minerals; whereas the larger countries have a 
proportionately greater share of manufactures in exports. 
7. Overall the small countries grew faster in the 1960s, but slower in the 
1970s than their larger counterparts. This is not only the case of over all 
growth, but perhaps, more importantly for their exports. 
8. The relatively large drop in the growth of exports did not produce a 
corresponding reduction in consumption or investment. 
9. The share of total government expenditures in GNP is not only 
considerably higher for the small countries, but it has been increasing 
relatively to the expansion taking place in the large countries; and 
10. Exports tend to be slightly more concentrated in the small countries. 
In short, it is clear that small and large developing countries do tend to 
differ in a number of significant areas in addition to the commonly mentioned 
ones of population size and export concentration. The contrasts in economic 
performance between small and large countries suggests that the size of a 
country may over time influence a number of economic relationships to 
produce a fairly homogenous environment in which growth takes place. The 
net result is the fairly distinctive performance patterns noted above. 
AN OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF SIZE 
An important question at this point is whether and to what extent the 
above differences between large and small nations were simply a function of 
the definition of size used (above and below five million population) Also, it is 
fairly clear that in assessing the economic performance of small and large 
countries, factors in addition to population should enter into the delineation 
between large and small countries. 
To avoid defining size as some arbitrary cut off point in population 
and/or as an arbitrarily weighted average of population, GNP and area, a 
factor analysis was performed on a large number of socioeconomic variables 
- some obviously related to size and others possibly, but not necessarily 
associated with this characteristic. Based on the discussion of 
structural/performance differences between large and small countries, 
twenty nine socioeconomic variables were factor analyzed to determine the 
composition of a ·size' dimension. · 
The factor analysis (Table 1) identified five main trends in the data set: 
(a} Factor 1, a measure of overall socioeconomic development, (b) Factor 2, a 
measure of trends in foreign trade; ( c) Factor 3, a measure of size, with the size 
dimension weighted largely by the area of the country (in thousands of square 
kilometers), the population (in millions), and the Gross Domestic Product; 
508 Manchester Papers on Development 
(d) Factor 4, a growth dimension, largely consisting of the growth in GDP, 
exports and the proportion of GDP allocated to investment, and (e) Factor 5, 
a dimension related to the external debt burden. 
Table 1. 
OBLIQUE ROTATED FACTOR PATTERN 
(standardized regression coefficients) 
Variable Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
socio-econ foreign size growth external 
development trade debt 
life expectancy 97• -8 -11 7 -3 
literacy rate 91* -31 -8 22 4 
% lab force indust 80* 12. 9 -18 -12 
% women in univ 77* -4 -11 15 4 
% pop in school 74* 14 -2 11 I5 
% pop w/safe water 73• 23 -3 -13 -2 
% pop urban 72* 20 22 -26 IO 
% pop work age 69* -38 4 7 -24 
pop per physician -68* -12 -II -17 -11 
pop per teacher -68* -20 -9 -I9 -I4 
% lab force in ag -88* -I4 -6 I7 2 
infant mortality -93* I4 23 -I2 IO 
growth priv cons -5 88* 8 20 -11 
growth imports -IO 76* I6 29 -25 
growth exports 9 76* -36 -IO 8 
pub exp/pop 26 73• -2 -34 -I5 
growth lab force -21 72* -11 3 20 
growth investment -5 66* 1 54 -24 
terms of trade I 66* 17 I -3 
priv cons/GDP -18 -74* 0 -3 -18 
area -IO -I 83* -1 17 
GDP I6 9 79* 6 -8 
population -12 -IO 52* I5 -IO 
growth GDP 2 21 8 80* 13 
investment/GDP I6 50 -12 52* IO 
growth exports 29 -20 I9 46* 
debt service/GDP 13 I2 -8 II 80* 
debt service/export 2 -18 39 7 12• 
debt/GDP -13 -3 -29 -1 65* 
Source: Computed from World Bank, World Development Report, (New York: Oxford 
University Press), various issues; and Ruth Sivard, World Military and Social 
Expenditures (Washington: World Priorities), various issues. 
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The country scores (Tables 2 and 3) on Factor 3, the size factor, are 
computed with a mean of zero-the 'larger' a country the greater its score on 
this factor. If we take positive scores as indicative of 'large', and negative 
scores as indicative of 'small', then we obtain a set of structure performance 
differences somewhat similar to that obtained above for the countries above 
and below five million: 
1. Smaller countries tend to have a lower state of socioeconomic 
development (Factor 1) poorer .trade performance (Factor 2), slower 
growth (Factor 3) and greater external public debt burdens. 
2. While the trade performance of large and small countries was similar to 
the 1960s, and declined in the 1970s and early 1980s, that of the small 
countries faired relatively worse. 
Table 2. 
FACTOR SCORES WITH REGARD TO SIZE (FACTOR 3): 
SMALLER COUNTRIES 
Factor Factor 
Country Score Country Score 
Israel -0.426 Sierra Leone -0.053 
Greece -0.159 Panama -1.130 
Honduras -0.630 Chad -0.623 
Cameroon -0.334 Uruguay -0.146 
Costa Rica -1.428 Tanzania -0.389 
Tunisia -0.245 Uganda -0.502 
Rwanda -0.529 Ethiopia -0.315 
Guatemala -0.394 Central African Rep -0.077 
Malawi -0.300 Bangladesh -0.045 
El Salvador -0.739 Burma -0.225 
Paraquay -0.409 Sri Lanka -0.995 
Philippines -0.187 Jamaica -1.231 
Ecuad.or -0.196 Trinidad -0.888 
Thailand -0.340 Zambia -0.546 
Malaysia -0.912 Kuwait -0.279 
Dominican Rep -0.338 Kenya -0.650 
Liberia -0.610 Jordan -0.673 
Ivory Coast -0.479 
Source: Derived from Table I. 
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3. While the government sector in both small and large countries 
accounted for a larger proportion of GDP over time, this expanded 
relatively rapidly in small countries. 
4. Smaller countries have distinctly lower savings rates relative to large 
countries. 
Table 3. 
FACTOR SCORES WITH REGARD TO SIZE (FACTOR 3): 
LARGER COUNTRIES 
Factor Factor 
Country Score Country. Score 
India 2.577 Algeria 0.822 
Nigeria 0.812 Libya 0.139 
Indonesia 0.945 Colombia 0.434 
Sudan 0.230 Chile 0.069 
Bolivia 0.379 Ghana 0.139 
Egypt 0.227 Argentina 1.349 
Korea 0.117 Peru 0.331 
Turkey 0.556 Saudi Arabia 1.064 
Spain 1.298 Brazil 4.199 
Venezuela 0.385 Mexico 1.674 
Source: Derived from Table I. 
To determine whether these patterns were simply a function of the 
somewhat arbitrary manner in which we have delineated large and small 
countries, several other groupings were examined (a) small countries were 
defined as those with a score of-0.35 or less on Factor 3 (with large countries 
as those scoring greater than -0.35), and (b) small countries as those with a 
score of 0.35 or less (and large as those countries with a factor score greater 
than 0.35. 
An examination of the means for these new groupings (Table 4), 
indicates considerable stability in the structural and performance patterns 
over a fairly wide range of reclassification of marginal countries between 
small and large groupings. 
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Table 4. 
SMALL AND LARGE COUNTRIES: STRUCTURAL CONTRASTS 
(means) 
Factor 3 Score Cut-off 
-0.35 0.0 0.35 
small large small large small large 
FACTOR DIMENSIONS 
Factor 1 socio/econ -0.14 0.09 -0.14 0.25 -0.09 0.29 
Factor 2 trade -0.18 0.11 -0.18 0.32 -0.12 0.38 
Factor 3 size -0.70 0.44 -0.51 0.89 -0.39 1.27 
Factor 4 growth -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.11 
Factor 5 ext debt 0.27 -0.17 0.06 -0.11 0.05 -0.16 
EXTERNAL TRADE 
Growth exp 1960-70 9.52 8.43 8.17 9.93 8.96 8.85 
Growth exp 1970-82 0.29 1.36 0.67 1.19 0.85 0.97 
Growth imp 1960-70 6.67 6.02 6.51 6.03 6.45 6.03 
Growth imp 1970-82 2.75 5.45 3.00 6.01 3.20 6.24 
Terms trade 1979 101.50 97.61 101.53 94.64 102.00 94.58 
Terms trade 1982 90.14 93.14 89.77 96.35 89.54 96.02 
GOVERNMENT SECTOR 
Govt con/GDP 1960 12.06 11.75 12.07 11.86 11.87 11.94 
Govt con/GDP 1982 18.71 15.42 18.72 16.33 17.02 16.50 
Govt debt/GDP 1970 44.05 36.15 44.06 42.75 35.25 47.10 
Govt debt/GDP 1982 45.90 33.90 45.90 36.38 39.86 38.01 
SA YING RATES 
Average 1970-81 14.54 18.08 15.06 18.41 15.27 18.61 
Marginal 1970-81 7.77 15.19 9.55 15.12 10.07 15.30 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, (New York: Oxford University Press); and 
World Bank, World Tables: The Third Edition. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1983). 
Finally, to determine which of the structural/performance measures 
were most closely associated (in a statistical sense) with size, a discriminant 
analysis was performed on the sample of smallest countries- those with factor 
scores of -0.35 or less. Out of the original sample of twenty five variables not 
related directly to size (the variables in Table 1 less population, area and 
GDP), three showed highly significant differences (Table 5) in means between 
large and small groups (a) public external debt to GDP in 1982, (b) the 
average marginal savings rate over the 1970-82 period, and (c) the ratio of 
public external debt to exports in 1970. 
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Table 5. 
SMALL/LARGE COUNTRY CLASSIFICATIONS: 
SIZE FACTOR/ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
(Factor 3 Score Cut-off= -0.35) 
Variable F Wilks' 
Statistic Lambda 
Public External Debt/GDP, 1982 13.47 0.609 
Average Marginal Savings Rate, 1970-81 5.90 0.471 
Debt Service/Exports, 1970 6.87 0.346 
Country Classification Probability of 
Factor 3 Discrirv.inant Factor 3 Classification 
Israel small small 97.15 
Greece large large 76.64 
India large large 98.92 
Honduras small small 92.83 
Cameroon large small* 43.18* 
Nigeria large large 79.66 
Indonesia large large 71.46 
Sudan large small* 33.60* 
Costa Rica small small 99.47 
Bolivia large large 55.90 
Egypt large large 94.96 
Tunisia large large 83.40 
Korea large large 94.81 
Rwanda small large* 46.85* 
Guatemala small large* 20.19* 
El Salvador small small 56.01 
Turkey , large large 89.79 
Spain large large 72.80 
Paraquay small large* 9.33* 
Venezuela large large 63.59 
Mexico large large 97.44 
Brazil large large 90.56 
Algeria large small* 43.52* 
Philippines large large 72.28 
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Table 5 (Cont'd). 
Country Classification Probability of 
Factor 3 Discriminant Factor 3 Classification 
Libya large large 81.30 
Ecuador large large 58.92 
Colombia large large 91.68 
Thailand small small 61.24 
Malaysia small small 59.13 
Ivory Coast small small 95.76 
Sierra Leone large large 55.65 
Panama small small 93.28 
Chile large large 94.64 
Chad small small 99.09 
Uruguay large large 97.67 
Tanzania small small 63.88 
Ethiopia large large 80.59 
CAR large small* 23.13* 
Ghana large large 80.74 
Burma large large 85.94 
Sri Lanka small small 54.13 
Jamaica small small 92.41 
Trinidad small large~ 15.47* 
Zambia small small 97.01 
Peru large large 67.31 
Saudi Arabia large large 88.16 
Kuwait large large 87.47 
Kenya small small 71.14 
From Factor 3 Classification to Discriminant Analysis Classification 
small large Total 
small 13 4 17 
large 4 27 48 
Using these three variables as discriminating factors on the original 
grouping of countries (based on factor scores whereby small= -0.35 or less), 
only eight countries were reclassified - four from small to large and four from 
large to small (Table 5). 
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From these results (Tables 4 and 5) we conclude that there are not only 
significant structural and performance differences between large and small 
countries, but that these differences hold over a fairly wide range of 
alternative definitions oflarge and small. More importantly, and contrary to 
the current conventional wisdom, the major differences between large and 
small countries appear to lie not so much in their relative export performance 
and structure, but instead, centre around differences in rates of savings and 
external public indebtedness. 
A MODEL OF SIZE AND GROWTH 
To summarize our findings thus far: 
1. Small and large countries differ with regard to a wide range of indices of 
economic performance. 
2. The critical performance variables differentiating small from large 
economies do not appear to centre around overall rates of growth (in 
Table 4 small countries did hl}ve consistently lower growth 
performances, but the difference in means between small and large 
countries was less for this factor than in the case of socio-economic 
development, trade, or external debt). Instead, the relatively low saving 
rates attained by the smaller countries appears to be a critical factor 
setting them apart from their larger counterparts. Perhaps as a result of 
their poor saving records, smaller countries have been forced to expand 
the role of government expenditures and resort to relatively high levels 
of external financing; 
3. If this is in fact the case, small countries may experience increasing 
difficulties in maintaining growth rates close to that likely to be 
experienced by larger economies. 
To test this last hypothesis a small macroeconomic model was 
developed. To capture the consequences of size, public sector expeditures and 
external debt, a growth equation was specified whereby growth in the 1970-82 
period (GDPGB) was specified as a function of: 
1. The average share of investment in GDP over the 1970-82 period 
(GDIB): 
2. The amount of external capital inflows during the period (as proxied by 
the accumulated public external debt, (PDB) in 1982. 
3. Public sector expenditures (as proxied by the average share of 
government consumption (PCB) in gross domestic product over the 
1970-81 period. 
In selecting variables responsible for the volume of public external debt 
accumulated by 1982, it is reasonable as a first step to assume that country size 
will have a direct relationship both to the amount of external indebtedness 
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and the individual country's capacity to service this debt. Clearly, a large 
country as measured by GNP will ceteris paribus have more financial and 
commercial relations with the rest of the world economy and, therefore, will 
be more likely to ·accumulate a larger debt volume than a small country. At 
the same time, due to the diversity of output and resource base, the debt 
servicing capacity of a large country is apt to be greater than that of a small 
country (and, consequently, a larger external debt can be accumulated) In 
general, we postulate that the larger the LDC economy as measured by its 
gross domestic product (GDPB) the greater its demand for external 
indebtedness. 
Second, a country's external debt should, in general, be related to its 
general volume of merchandise imports (MTEB). For LDCs, the volume of 
merchandise imports often tends to have a direct relationship to the country's 
GNP, thus providing an additional source of demand for debt. Since in a 
growing economy a share of imports will have to be financed, a country's 
indebtedness will be higher as total imports increase. 
Third, an economy with improving terms of trade should be able to 
service a larger amount of foreign debt. As is well known, movements in the 
terms of trade (TTB) are used by lending institutions as a key indicator of debt 
service capacity. For practical purposes, it is safe to assume that lenders' 
willingness to supply debt varies directly with the degree of improvement in 
the country's terms of trade. 
Fourth, international reserve holdings (GIRB) may be another 
important factor in affecting the volume of a country's external debt. Here the 
relationship is likely to be more complex. Logically, as a country's reserves 
increase, its ability to service a growing external debt and, hence, its credit-
worthiness should also increase. On the other hand, everything else equal, one 
might expect that the larger a country's external revenues, the less pressing the 
need for additional debt to finance imports. Therefore, possession of a large 
volume of international reserves may result in larger or smaller volumes of 
external debt. 
Finally there is increasing evidence (Looney, 1987; Looney, 
forthcoming) that large numbers of developing countries have used external 
borrowing to finance the rapid build up in military expenditures (ME) that 
took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
The next step in the analysis is to isolate the main supply and demand 
influences on Third World indebtedness by deriving a reduced form equation 
that is capable of measuring the influence of all independent variables 
simultaneously. In the specification. Gross National Product (GDPB), was 
assumed to be the most significant factor affecting the demand for external 
debt, followed by total imports (METB), and military expenditures (ME).6 
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The main variables assumed to affect the supply of external loans were 
those reflective of the borrowing country's ability to service debt. Gross 
International Reserves (GIRB) and the terms of trade (TTB)were assumed to 
be the indicators most international lenders considered as indicative of a 
country's borrowing capacity. Notationally: 
a) Total debt (PDB) supply= fl (reserves, terms of trade), and 
b) Total debt (PDB) demand = f2 (GDP, imports, military 
expenditures). · 
c) Total debt (supply)= total debt (demand). Dividingequations(a) 
and (b) by the equilibrium level of total debt as specified in 
equation (c), we obtain equation (d) 
d) fl/(total debt) = f2/(total debt). Expressing equation (d) 
implicitly, we can write 
e) xl (fl/total debt), f2/total debt),,;, 0, or 
f) x2 (total debt, GDP, imports, military expenditures, reserves, 
terms of trade) = 0, or 
g) PDB = f3 [GDPB(+), MTEB(+), ME(+), GIRB(+), TTB(+)] =O 
To close the model, equations were also estimated for GDIB, the share 
of investment in GDP, and PCB, the share of public consumption in GDP-
variables also appearing in the growth equation. 
Government consumption is assumed to increase with increases in per 
capita income (GNPPER). Public consumption is also assumed to increase 
with increased financing (PDPB, the average share of public external debt in 
GDP, 1970-82) and as military expenditures MEY (the average ratio of 
military expenditures to GNP, 1970-81) increase (a large proportion ofThird 
World military expenditures are salaries and therefore classified as current 
expenditures). 
The share of investment in GDP is assumed to increase with savings (MS, 
the average marginal rate of savings, 1970-81 ), facilitating increased levels of 
private sector investment, and public external debt, PDPB, facilitating 
increased levels of public sector investment. Finally, it is assumed that private 
external capital flows are responsive to the degree of openness (as proxied by 
EB, the average share of exports in GNP, 1970-81) of the economy. 
For completeness and as a basis of comparison, the equations were 
estimated for our three groups of small/large countries and are presented in 
the summary table in Appendix A. 
Although there are always notable exceptions to any generalizations 
concerning the development process of lower income countries, several fairly 
distinct patterns stand out. In general the results presented in Appendix A 
tend to confirm our hypothesis concerning the increased difficulties facing 
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smaller countries in their attempt to keep pace with their larger counterparts. 
In particular: 
a) Consistent results were obtained irrespective of marginal inclusions or 
exclusions of countries form each group - the results do not appear 
overly sensitive to the definition of small/large. Over a fairly wide range 
of factor scores on a size factor comprised largely of the population, · 
Gross Domestic Product and area of a large sample of developing 
countries, the size of the coefficients and statistical significance of key 
variables remained fairly constant. 
b) The overall mechanismsofgrowth(equations 1, la, lb and 5, 5aand 5b) 
show several important contrasts between large and small countries. 
Most importantly, small countries tend to experience negative·impacts 
on growth (GDPGB) as the share of government consumption (PCB) in 
Gross Domestic Product increases. Larger countries do not appear to 
experience this problem, at least in the ranges government consumption 
has risen to in our sample countries. On the other hand the share of 
investment in GDP (GDIB) has had a very similar impact on growth in 
both large and small countries (the almost identical size of the 
coefficients on the GDIB term for both groups of countries). The same 
general pattern holds for the role of public external debt (PDB) in both 
groups of countries. 
c) In searching for reasons for the ineffectiveness of government 
consumption to simulate growth in small countries (equations 2, 2a, 
and 2b and 6a, 6b and 6c) it appears that one potential source of 
problem lies in the fact that small and large countries differ in the 
manner in which public consumption has increased in recent years. 
Small countries tend to have a much greater increases in public 
consumptioh stemming from increased defense expenditures (MEY) 
than do their larger counterparts (the size of the coefficient is nearly 
twice as large for small countries as for large countries - in addition the 
level of statistical significance is somewhat higher for MEY in the 
smaller countries). 
d) Large countries tend to increase government consumption more or less 
in line with increases in their per capita incomes (GNPPER), 
demonstrating a Wagner type relationship - as economies grow, the 
state assumes a greater role in providing for security, health, education 
and the like. The process of public expenditures increasing with per 
capita income appears to be reflective of countries seeking a balance 
between public. and private sector activities as they mature. In contrast 
small countries do not appear to have established a pattern whereby 
public expenditures increase in line with greater per capita incomes. For 
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these countries, public expenditures do not seem to be complementary 
to private sector activity, but instead, determined by other factors such 
as security. As such these expenditures are less likely than in the case of 
larger countries to increase overall output. 
e) Public sector consumption appears to have been financed to a greater 
extent in large countries through increases in external debt (PDPB)- the 
coefficient on this term is consistently higher in the larger countries. 
Financing public consumption through external (as opposed to 
internal) sources may result in large countries not being forced to divert 
as large a proportion of resources from private sector activity in order to 
increase public consumption. 
t) External financing (PDPB), however, appears to have played a much 
greater role in increasing investment (GDIB in equations 3, 3a and 3b, 
and equations 7, 7a and 7b) in the larger countries- public external debt 
is barely significant in the ~mall country regressions, while it is quite 
strong for two of the large countryo groupings. 
g) Investment as a share of GDP (GDIGB) appears to increase as 
countries become more open (as evidenced by the positive sign on EB, 
the share of exports in GDP). Smaller countries however appear to be 
slightly less capable of benefitting from this effect than their larger 
counterparts. (as evidenced by the slightly lower level of significance of 
the EB term for smaller countries). Here, however, the large/small 
country differences are only marginal. In contrast to assertions often 
made in the literature, smaller countries, having a generally much larger 
share of exports in GDP, do not appear to be at any particular 
disadvantages vis-a-vis large countries in channeling resources into 
investment. 
h) The factors leading to increased levels of external debt appear to differ 
greatly between small and large countries (equations 4, 4a and 4b, and 
equations 8, 8a and 8b). Small countries do not show any close 
relationship between the overall level of output and production (as 
proxied by Gross Domestic Product, GDPB). Their capacity for 
productive use of external funds, together with their ability to service 
these commitments, must ceteris paribus be less than in the case of the 
larger countries. 
i) In contrast to larger countries, smaller countries have used public 
external debt to finance a higher level of imports (MTEB) than would 
have otherwise been the case. 
. 
j) Most importantly, however, it appears that a large volume of public 
external debt in the smaller countries has gone to finance higher levels of 
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military expenditures (ME). This has not been generally the case in large 
countries. 
k) Large countries have been able to increase their external indebtedness in 
line with their improved terms of trade (TTB). Small countries have not 
shown a distinct pattern between terms of trade and their external 
borrowings. 
A consistent pattern appears to be present in the contrasting experience 
in small and larger countries. In general the smaller countries have used 
external public borrowing to finance military expenditures. Military 
expenditures have also been considerably more important in allowing these 
countries to increase the share of public consumption in GDP (relatively to 
that of the larger countries). In addition larger countries have been able to 
channel a greater volume of external funds into investment (relative to their 
smaller counterparts. 
Given the general unproductive nature of military expenditures, these 
patterns may explain in part why smaller countries have not been able to 
derive positive on growth from increased levels of public sector consumption 
- in fact the impact on growth of increased levels of government consumption 
has been negative. 
CONCLUSIONS 
At the beginning of the study we asked whether small developing 
countries differ from their larger counterparts in areas other than sireper se -
GDP, population, area and in addition to the commonly noted factors such as 
concentration of exports, the large share of exports in GDP and so on. If so 
what are the possible consequences of these differences? Has 'smallness' 
manifested itself in a manner tending to produce a different growth 
mechanism from that experienced by larger economies, and if so what are the 
implications for security and the possible introduction of alternative 
economic systems such as socialism? 
The answer to the first question appears to be yes. One of the main 
findings is that small countries tend to have a considerably larger share of 
GDP accounted for by the public sector. While the over all growth rates of 
small and large countries has not varied considerably, because the public 
sector has over expanded in smaller countries, and has tended to have a 
negative impact on growth, there is some question as to the ability of these 
countries to sustain rates of growth equal to that of their larger counterparts, 
especially if their exports do not return to the levels of growth experienced in 
the 1960s (Table 4) . 
Put differently, small economies in general have expanded public sector 
involvement in their economies in a futile attempt to maintain the growth 
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momentum built up in the 1960s, but jeopardized in the 1970s bypoor(for the 
group as a whole) export performance. Public sector expansion however has 
left in its wake relatively large external public sector debts. 
If socialism is associated with an expanded role of the public sector in 
economic activity, the results obtained above also throw into question the 
assertion often made that socialism is a viable economic system in smaller, 
less developed countries, (Best, 1966; Manley, 1977; Beckford and Witter, 
1980). 
The results also reveal the problems smaller countries have in providing for 
their defence. It appears that there may be real economies of scale in the 
provision of security, with smaller countries faced with a much greater real 
security burden than their larger counterparts. 
The net result of these developments appears to be that the medium term 
growth prospects for this group of countries as a whole is considerably less 
favourable than for their larger counterpa~ts. 
NOTES 
1. Related works include Reid (1974); Frisch (1974); Looney (1979). The 
classic works in the field are Robinson (1963) and Demas (1965). 
2. See also Chenery and Strout (1966). 
3. An issue first explored in Morawetz (1980). 
4. Kuznets (1963) used a cut off point of ten million as in his view this 
figure 'provided a rough decision made with an eye to the distribution of 
nations by size as its exists today and has existed over the last 50-75 
years'. Demas (1965) defined small nations as countries that had 
populations of five million or less and with usable land area of 10 to 20 
thousand square miles or less. Chenery and Syrquin (1975) used a cut 
off point of 15 million. 
5. The data used for this comparison is from World Development (1984). 
6. Here GDPB is the average level of GDP, 1970-82; METB is the average 
level of imports, 1970-82; and ME the average level of military 
expenditures 1970-82. Data are from The World Bank: World 
Development Report and World Tables, and US Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 
various issues. 
7. Cf. the discussion of this and the military expenditure variable MEY in 
Whynes (1979), chapter 2. 
I 
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APPENDIX A 
RESULTS: SMALL COUNTRIES 
(two stage least squares estimates - standardized coefficients) 
Growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDPGB) 
(factor analysis small/large division * * factor score = + 0.35) 
(1) GDPDB = 0.62 GDIB + 0.40 PDB - 0.41 PCB 
(4.75) (3.19) (-2.96) 
(factor analysis small/large division * * factor score = 0.0) 
(la) GDPDB = 0.54 GDIB + 0.37 PDB - 0.56 PCB 
(3.18) (2.31) (-3.05) 
(factor analysis small/large division * * factor score = - 0.35) 
(lb) GDPDB = 0.57 GDIB + 0.42 PDB - 0.52 PCB 
(3.07) (l.83) (-2.22) 
Share of Public Consumption in GDP (PCB) 
(factor analysis small/large division * • factor score = + 0.35) 
(2) PCB= 0.14 GNPPER + 0.56 PDPB + 0.46 MEY 
(l.13) (5.08) (3.59) 
(factor analysis small/large division• • factor score= 0.0) 
(2a) PCB= 0.12 GNPPER + 0.53 PDPB + 0.48 MEY 
(0.93) (4.58) (3.65) 
(factor analysis small/large division • • factor score = - 0.35) 
(2b) PCB= 0.10 GNPPER = 0.44 PDPB + 0.52 MEY 
(0.48) (2. 76) (2.49) 
Share of Investment in GDP (GDIB) 
(factor analysis small/large division • * factor score = + 0.35) 
(3) GDIB = 0.47 MS+ 0.28 PDPB + 0.41 EB 
(3.77) (2.04) (3.01) 
r2 = 0.526; F = 11.l l; df = 33 
r2 = 0.382; F = 5.57; df = 30 
r2 = 0.427; F = 4.22; df= 20 
r2 = 0.600; F = 17.54. df= 33 
r2 = 0.669; F = 18.23; df = 30 
r2 = 0.674; F = 20. 72; df = 20 
r2 = 0.600; F = 17.54; df= 33 
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(factor analysis small/large division • * factor score = 0.0) 
(3a) GDIB = 0.62 MS+ 0.29 PDPB + 0.33 EB 
(4.77) (1.91) (2.16) 
(factor analysis small/large division * * factor score= - 0.3S) 
(3b) GDIB = 0.43 MS+ 0.18 PDPB + 0.43 EB 
(2.32) (0.90) (2.21) 
Public External Debt (PDB) 
(factor analysis small/large division * • factor score= + 0.3S) 
r2= 0.723; F= 18.27; df= 30 
r2 = 0.S09; F = S.88; df = 20 
(4) PDB = 0.13 GDPB- 0.06 GIRB + 0.31 MTEB + O.S9 ME+ 0.34 TIB 
(0.87) (-O.S2) (l.72) (4.32) (0.47) 
r2 = 0.886; F = 43.41; df = 33 
(factor analysis small/large division * * factor score-= 0.0) 
(4a) PDB = 0.17 GDPB- 0.o7 GIRB + 0.24 MTEB + 0.64 ME+ o.oi TIB 
(0.79) (-0.3S) (0.83) (4.39) (0.08) 
r2 = 0.824; F = 23.49; df = 30 
(factor analysis small/large division * • factor score = - 0.3S) 
(4b) PDB = 0.36 GDPB- 0.92 GIRB + 0.61 MTEB + 0.96 ME+ 0.01 TIB 
(1.71) (-4.11) (2.13) (8.18) (0.18) 
r2 = 0.9S7; F = 6S.90; df = 20 
RESULTS: LARGE COUNTRIES 
Growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDPGB) 
(factor analysis small/large division * * factor score = + 0.3S) 
(S) GDPGB = 0.6S GDIB + O.SO PDB - 0.01 PCB 
(3.71) (2.90) (-0.01) 
(factor analysis small/large division * * factor score = 0.0) 
(Sa) GDPGB = O.S8 GDIB + 0.33 PDB - 0.01 PCB 
(3.50) (2.07) (-0.0S) 
(factor analysis small/large division * * factor score = - 0.3S) 
(Sb) GDPGB = 0.68 GDIB + 0.28 PDB- 0.11 PCB 
(4.67) (2.027) (-0.80) 
r2 = O.S70; F = 6.62; df = 18 
r2 = 0.447; F = S.67; df= 24 
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Share of Public Consumption in GDP (PCB) 
(factor analysis small/large division * * factor score = + 0.3S) 
(6) PCB + 0.22 GNPPER + 0.80 PDPB + 0.23 MEY 
(1.69) (S.31) (2.0S) 
(factor analysis small/large division • * factor score = 0.0) 
(6a) PCB= 0.27 GNPPER + 0.81 PDPB + 0.2S MEY 
(2.33) (6.17) (2.11) 
(factor analysis small/large division * * factor score = - 0.3S) 
(6b) PCB= 0.27 GNPPER + 0.7S PDPB + 0.37 MEY 
(2.87) (7.SS) (4.11) 
Share of Investment in GDP (GDIB) 
(factor analysis small/large divison * • factor score = + 0.3S) 
(7) GDIB = 0.39 MS+ 0.10 PDPB + 0.78 EB 
(2. 74) (0.64) (S.83) 
(factor analysis small/large division • • factor score = 0.0) 
(7a) GDIB = 0.63 MS+ 0.47 PDPB + 0.38 EB 
(4.60) (3.13) (2.63) 
(factor analysis small/large division • * factor score = - 0.3S) 
(7b) GDIB = O.S2 MS+ 0.32 PDPB + O.S2 EB 
(4.81) (2.80) (4.79) 
Public External Debt (PDB) 
(factor analysis small/large division • * factor score = + 0.3S) 
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r2= 0.801; F= 20.17; df= 18 
r2 = 0.782; F = 2S.09; df= 24 
r2= 0.801; F= 37.84; df= 31 
r2 = 0.810; F = 21.32; df= 18 
r2 = 0.8S4; F = 31.26; df = 24 
r2 = 0.776; F = 32.46; df= 31 
(8) PDB = 1.49 GDPB - 0.43 GIRB - 0.6S MTEB - O.OS ME + 0.26 TIB 
(4.4S) (-1.81) (-1.81) (-0.19) (1.62) 
r2= 0.717; F= 6.61; df= 18 
(factor analysis small/large division * * factor score = 0.0) 
(Sa) PDB = 1.13 GDPB - O.S7 GIRB- 0.37 MTEB + 0.19 ME+ 0.29 TIB 
(4.31) (-2.80) (-1.30) (0.86) (2.08) 
r2 = 0.664; F = 7 .S2; df = 24 
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(factor analysis small/large division • • factor score = - 0.35) 
(Sb) PDB = 1.16 GDPB- 0.56 GIRB- 0.29 MTEB + 0.12 ME+ 0.27 TIB 
(5.07) (-3.19) (-l.10) (0.59) (2.20) 
r2 = 0.666; F = 10.41; df = 31 
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